



# Multi-objective Optimization: Joint Inversion of Geophysical Datasets

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# Multi-objective Optimization

- The process of optimizing systematically and simultaneously a collection of objective functions is called multi-objective optimization (MOO) or vector optimization.
- The general MOO is defined as follows:  
$$\text{Minimize } F(\mathbf{m}) = [f_1(\mathbf{m}), f_2(\mathbf{m}), f_3(\mathbf{m}), \dots, f_n(\mathbf{m})]$$
Within a feasible regions and with some constraints.

# MOO-Common Approach Weighted Global Criterion Method

$$\text{minimize } \sum_{i=1}^n w_i f_i(m)$$

# Example 1



- Joint inversion of first-arrival traveltime and gravity data
- Results from OBS data over the subduction zone of Taiwan.

# Objective

## Joint Inversion of Seismic and Gravity Data

### Why Joint Inversion?

Simultaneous interpretation of multi-set geophysical data can be useful to obtain an integrated model which will be more geologically feasible.

Combined use of different methods helps to fill up the gap of one method by the other and thus, one can capitalize on the advantages of each method.

# Physical Parameters



- Gravity anomalies are caused by density contrasts.
- Seismic travel times are sensitive to wave velocities that are functions of density.
- Seismic wave amplitudes are affected by variations in  $V_p$ ,  $V_s$  and density.
- Often seismic velocity and density are correlated.

# Methodology

Travel time

$$T = f_1(\alpha(\mathbf{x}))$$

Gravity



$$\mathbf{g} = f_2(\rho(\mathbf{x}))$$

$\alpha(\mathbf{x})$  represent spatial distributions of compressional wave velocity

$\rho(\mathbf{x})$  represent density and  $\mathbf{x}$  represent a position vector.

# Model Parameterization

## Arc-tangent Basis functions



$x_k$  is the horizontal location of an arc-tangent node,

$\Delta z_k$  is the vertical throw attained asymptotically over a horizontal distance of  $b_k$ .



# Arc-tangent



$$z(x) = z_0 + \sum_{k=1}^n \Delta z_k \left( 0.5 + \frac{1}{\pi} \tan^{-1} \left( \frac{x - x_k}{b_k} \right) \right)$$

$z$  is the depth,

$n$  is the number of arc-tangent nodes,

$z_0$  is the average depth of the interface,

# Velocity-Density Relation



$$\rho(x, z) = a_1 + a_2 \alpha(x, z) + a_3 \alpha^2(x, z) + a_4 \alpha^3(x, z) + a_5 \alpha^4(x, z)$$

$$a_1 = 0.6997, a_2 = 2.23, a_3 = -0.598, a_4 = 0.0703, a_5 = -0.00283$$

# Objective function



$$F(\alpha(\mathbf{x}), \rho(\mathbf{x})) = \|\mathbf{T}_{obs} - \mathbf{T}_{syn}\| + w \|\mathbf{g}_{obs} - \mathbf{g}_{syn}\|$$

$\mathbf{T}_{obs}$  and  $\mathbf{T}_{syn}$  - observed and synthetic travel time data,  
 $\mathbf{g}_{obs}$  and  $\mathbf{g}_{syn}$  - observed and synthetic gravity data,

$\|\cdot\|$  - suitable norm

$w$  - weighting factor

$$F(\alpha(\mathbf{x}), \rho(\mathbf{x})) = (\mathbf{T}_{obs} - \mathbf{T}_{syn})^T \mathbf{C}_T^{-1} (\mathbf{T}_{obs} - \mathbf{T}_{syn}) + w (\mathbf{g}_{obs} - \mathbf{g}_{syn})^T \mathbf{C}_g^{-1} (\mathbf{g}_{obs} - \mathbf{g}_{syn})$$

$\mathbf{C}_T$  and  $\mathbf{C}_g$  are the data covariance matrices for travel time and gravity respectively.

# Introduction

Very Fast Simulated Annealing

Start at  $\mathbf{x}_0$  with Error  $E(\mathbf{x}_0)$

$\mathbf{x}_1 = \mathbf{x}_0 + \Delta\mathbf{x}; E(\mathbf{x}_1)$


Reduce temperature

temperature dependent

Accept  $\mathbf{x}_1$  with Prob =  $\exp(-\Delta E/T)$


Weigh each model with  $\exp(-E(x))$  and then evaluate the integrals to estimate the marginal PPD, posterior mean, covariance and correlation matrices

# Study Area




Taiwan is basically an artifact of an ongoing collision between the Eurasian plate and Luzon volcanic arc at the southwestern edge of Philippine Sea plate. The collision has been propagating from north to south due to an oblique orientation of the Luzon arc with respect to Eurasian plate generating the Taiwan Orogen.


NW subduction of PSP beneath the Eurasian plate in the NW portion of the Circum-Pacific Belt is the main tectonic motion causing high seismicity in the



Line 1 OBS 17



OBS data 17






OBS data 17

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
Line 14 OBS 22

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
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# Result Line 1






# Line 1




**Velocity model obtained after travel time inversion**

# Line 1




**Density model obtained from the velocity model of travel time inversion**


# Line 1




# Line 1 – Joint Inversion





# Line 1 – Joint Inversion




# Line 1 – Joint






Density model obtained after joint inversion

# Line 14




velocity model obtained travel time inversion







# Line 14




Density model obtained after travel time inversion




# Line 14



**Velocity model obtained by linearized tomographic  
inversion**




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


Velocity model after joint inversion

# Line 14



Density model obtained after joint inversion





# Problem with Global Criterion Method



- Choice of weights → non-trivial!

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
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# Story of a Genius

## Prof. John Forbes Nash, Jr



- Hollywood movie: A beautiful mind → focuses on Nash's mathematical genius and apparent struggle with paranoid schizophrenia
- Undergrad: Carnegie Tech;  
PhD: Princeton
- Letter of recommendation  
***This man is a genius***  
[ Carnegie Tech professor, R.J. Duffin]




# Story of a Genius

## Prof. John Forbes Nash, Jr



- Earned a PhD in 1950 with a 28 page dissertation on ***game theory***
- Developed the properties and concepts of ***Nash Equilibrium***



# Classical Game Theory



- Basic Definitions

A game consists of:

- 1) A set of Players
- 2) A set of Strategies, dictating what action a player can take.
- 3) A pay-off function, a reward for a given set of strategy choices  
eg. Money, happiness

**The aim of the game:**

Each player wants to optimize their own pay-off.

# Nash Equilibrium



- A Nash equilibrium is a situation where each player has chosen a strategy which has given them the best possible outcome given what the other players have chosen to.
- If the game was played again then no player could improve by being the only person to change their strategy.

# Prisoner's Dilemma



- The **prisoner's dilemma** is a canonical example of a game, that shows why two individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interest to do so.
- Two men are arrested, but the police do not possess enough information for a conviction.
- Following the separation of the two men, the police offer both a similar deal—
  - if one testifies against his partner (defects/betrays), and the other remains silent (cooperates/assists), the betrayer goes free and the cooperator receives the full one-year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only one month in jail for a minor charge. If each 'rats out' the other, each receives a three-month sentence.
  - Each prisoner must choose either to betray or remain silent; the decision of each is kept quiet.

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# Prisoner's Dilemma



	Prisoner B stays silent ( <i>cooperates</i> )	Prisoner B confesses ( <i>defects</i> )
Prisoner A stays silent ( <i>cooperates</i> )		
Prisoner A confesses ( <i>defects</i> )		

What should they do? If it is supposed here that each player is only concerned with lessening his time in jail, the game becomes a non-zero sum game where the two players may either assist or betray the other. In the game, the sole worry of the prisoners seems to be increasing his own reward. The interesting symmetry of this problem is that the logical decision leads both to betray the other, even though their individual 'prize' would be greater if they cooperated.


# Game Theoretical MOO

Optimization of **X** **Y**  
 Player 1      Player 2


Player 1 = Population 1

Player 2 = Population 2

Generation k-1



Generation k



Generation k+1



sends  $X_{k-1}$

sends  $Y_{k-1}$

sends  $X_k$

sends  $Y_k$





# Example – Joint inversion of PP and PS data



- Weighted Global Criterion Method
- Game Theoretical



# GT Inversion workflow





Cost function error analysis of GT inversion for PP & PS wave



# Prestack joint inversion



One step inversion for pp & ps

Two step inversion for pp & ps

# Prestack joint inversion



One step inversion for pp & ps

Two step inversion for pp & ps





# Where do we go from here?

Uncertainty estimation  
Quantum Games

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# Quantum Games



The outcome of a quantum system can be probabilistic or even cannot be described by (local) probability theory.

Quantu  
m


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
Player 1 = Population 1

Player 2 = Population 2

Generation k-1



Generation k



Generation k+1



sends  $X_{k-1}$

sends  $Y_{k-1}$

sends  $X_k$

sends  $Y_k$